Scenario # 6, Sabine Cross-Roads LA – 8 April 1864, 8 AM

Historical Summary & Scenario Situation. 
The Red River Campaign occurred March 10 to May 19, 1864. The campaign was conducted by the Union General Nathaniel Banks to accomplish two major goals: secure cotton for the northern textile mills and end any hope of French intervention from Mexico (Emperor Maximilian) through Texas.

The Union objective was the seizure of Shreveport in the northwest corner of Louisiana, not far from Texas and Arkansas. Shreveport was the headquarters of the Confederate army's Trans-Mississippi Department, and had become a thriving manufacturing center of weapons and a supply depot.

Commanding the West Louisiana Department was Major General Richard Taylor, the son of President Zachary Taylor, who had served under Stonewall Jackson during the 1862 Valley Campaign. Taylor planned to fight in the Jacksonian fashion and was unconcerned as he began the campaign with barely 7,000 men under his command.  As General Banks' Federal army neared Shreveport, it contained about 24,000 men of all arms.  General Taylor's Confederate army had been reinforced to approximately 16,000 men.

Nathaniel Banks, who had also fought against Stonewall Jackson in the Valley Campaign - unsuccessfully, was posted to the Trans-Mississippi because he had more political connections than talent.  While a competent administrator and strategic planner, Banks was lacking as an operational commander.  On his approach march to Shreveport, the majority of his success was due to errors and lethargy of Kirby Smith, the CSA Trans-Mississippi commander, in supporting Taylor’s initiatives. As Banks neared Smith’s headquarters at Shreveport, resources and suitable amounts of infantry and cavalry became available to Taylor.  However, Banks disposition of forces was fatally flawed as he placed approximately 700 supply wagons between his advance guard, the lead two divisions of the XIII Corps, and the main body of his column.  Given the restricted road network in the swamps of Louisiana, this disposition of forces meant that his advance guard force would fight any initial battle without hope of reinforcement.

On April 8, 1864, Brigadier General Albert L. Lee, commander of the Union’s advance guard cavalry boldly charged a small contingent of Confederate cavalry on the Moss Plantation below Mansfield.  Thereby giving Taylor the information he needed to mass his troops.  General Taylor selected a site to defend about four miles south of Mansfield at Sabine Cross-Roads, a strategic communications hub. General Taylor had organized a defensive position with the infantry divisions of the Generals Walker and Mouton, and Bee's cavalry.  BG A. L. Lee detected the Confederate main force, organized a defense, and requested infantry support.  Initially two brigades from Ransom's 13th Corps, under Brigadier General Landrum, were advanced to support the Federal cavalry.  Seeing the deployed Confederate force, Landrum brought up the remaining brigades of his division and requested that Cameron’s division reinforce him.

Although neither commander had all his forces available and neither intended to fight a major action here, a general engagement was brought on by Confederate Brigadier General Alfred Mouton's division later on April 8th.  As Mouton's division rolled forward General Taylor realized the commitment had been made and ordered a general advance of his entire line.  The attack resulted in the Confederate advance reaching Honeycutt Hill with both flanks of the Union line being turned and a pell-mell retreat began.  Brigadier General Cameron had just deployed his division of infantry of the 13th Corps. into another line of battle.  In minutes both of Cameron's flanks were overlapped and he was forced to retire.  Confederate cavalry continued the pursuit and reported another line of Union infantry. This was Brigadier General William H. Emory's division of the XIX Corps, some 5,800 strong, and nicely placed atop a ridge. Taylor ordered the attack to continue but three separate attempts could not dislodge the Federals from their ridge overlooking Chapman's Bayou.  The Battle of Sabine Cross-Roads was over.

This scenario starts with the disposition of Taylor’s forces in its staging areas and the Union XIII Corps deployed in its forward positions.  Union forces have Emory’s Division of the XIX Corps enroute to Mansfield/Sabine Cross-Roads.  The two teams in this scenario play the forces of Generals Taylor, Landrum, Cameron, Lee, and the reinforcing division of William H. Emory.  The game lasts 6 turns representing the focus of the battle at Honeycutt Hill.

 Scenario Victory Conditions.
Victory is determined by possession of the Junction Hex on Honeycutt Hill or the destruction/neutralization of Banks’ advance guard. Control of the junction hex is determined by physical occupation. Calculation of losses by the Union compared to the Confederate forces determines if neutralization of the advance guard is achieved.  The tally must be at least 2:1 Union losses compared to CSA for a claim of victory to be justified. The determination of the scenario winner is done at the end of T6.

Historical Results.
General Taylor had his victory. In all 3,200 Federals were killed, wounded, captured or missing compared to approximately 1,000 Confederates.  However included in the price was General Mouton along with several other field grade officers who had been killed. That night General Banks withdrew his forward divisions to a line formed by Brigadier General Emroy's division and two divisions of Major General A.J. Smith at Pleasant Hill. So the battle of Mansfield ended with a Confederate victory.  More importantly, the defeat at Sabine Cross-Roads combined with the casualties incurred at Peasant Hill the next day convinced General Banks to end his campaign to capture Shreveport.  Taylor’s audacity had carried the day.

Special Instructions.
The following entry restrictions apply for all units marching strategically into Sabine Cross-Roads LA (scenario #6):

Union ENTRY commands must be between: 1-25 to 1-41
CSA should not have any units marching into Sabine Cross-Roads.

Additionally, no units are allowed to go into breastworks (form: bw command).

Any deliberate violation of this restriction is grounds for a forfeit by the offending team.
 

Reference URLs: 
http://www2.cr.nps.gov/abpp/battles/la018.htm
http://www.americancivilwar.com/statepic/la/la018.html
http://www.topozone.com/map.asp?z=15&n=3543229&e=435041&s=50&loc=Mansfield